Showing posts with label CBR. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CBR. Show all posts

Friday, July 6, 2018

6/7/18: Central Bank of Russia Injects Capital in Three Lenders, Continues Sector Restrcturing


Reuters reported (https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-banks/russian-c-bank-says-to-deposit-2-8-bln-at-otkritie-trust-and-rost-idUSR4N1TT00E) on Central Bank of Russia (CBR) setting up a 'bad bank' to resolve non-performing assets in three medium- large-sized banks that CBR controls. In 2016, the CBR took over control over three medium- large-sized banks, Otkritie, B&N Bank and Promsvyazbank. Last month, the CBR announced an injection of RB 42.7 billion of funds to recapitalise Otkritie with funds earmarked to cover losses in Otkritie's pension fund.  Most Bank received RB37.1 billion in new capital. The CBR also deposited RB 174.2 billion (USD2.78 billion) in three banks (RB63.3 billion of which went to Otkritie) on a 3-5 years termed deposit basis.

The funds will be used to reorganise banks operations and shift non-performing and high risk assets to a Trust Bank-based 'bad bank' which will operate as an asset management company.

After divesting bad loans, Otkritie is expected to be sold back to private investors.

CBR's total exposure to troubled banks is now at RB 227 billion (USD3.5 billion), with CBR having spent RB 760 billion (USD 12 billion) on its overall campaign to recapitalise troubled lenders. CBR holds RB 1.3 trillion (USD30 billion) on deposit with lenders it controls.

As BOFIT note: "...the CBR to date has used over 45 billion USD (about 3% of 2017 GDP) in supporting the three banks that it took over last year. Some of this amount, however, should be recovered when assets in banks acquired by the CBR are sold off as well as in the planned privatisations of the banks." At the beginning of June, Otkritie stated that the bank aims to float a 15-20% stake in 2021. The bank said t's target for pricing will be "at least 1.3 times the capital the bank has at the end of 2020". Otkritie targets return on equity of 18% in 2020, and so far, in the first five months of 2018, the bank made RB 5.4 billion in net profit, per CBR.

Otkritie ranked sixth largest bank in Central and Eastern Europe by capitalisation by The Banker in 2017 prior to nationalisation. Following nationalisation, Otkritie ranked 16th in CEE, having lost some USD2.4 billion in capital.

Another lender, Sovetsky bank from Saint Petersburg lost its license on July 3. The bank gas been in trouble since February 2012 when the CBR approved its first plans for restructuring. In February 2018, the bank was in a "temporary administration" through the Banking Sector Consolidation Fund. The latest rumours suggest that Sovetsky deposits and loans assets will retransferred to another lender.  Sovetsky was under original administration by another lender, Tatfondbank, from March 2016, until Tatfondbank collapsed in March 2017 (official CBR statement https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/PR/?file=03032017_105120eng2017-03-03T10_47_12.htm, and see this account of criminal activity at the Tatfondbank: https://en.crimerussia.com/financialcrimes/collapse-of-tatfondbank-robert-musin-siphoned-off-funds-from-state-owned-bank/ and https://en.crimerussia.com/financialcrimes/tatfondbank-officially-collapses/). Tatfondbank's tangible connection to Ireland's IFSC was covered here: https://realnoevremya.com/articles/1292-tatfondbank-raised-60-million-via-obscure-irish-company-just-before-collapse.

Overall, CBR have done as good a job of trying to clean up Russian banking sector mess, as feasible, with criminal proceedings underway against a range of former investors and executives. The cost of the CBR-led resolution and restructuring actions has been rather hefty, but the overall outrun has been some moderate strengthening of the sector, hampered by the tough trading conditions for Russian banking sector as a whole. A range of U.S. and European sanctions against Russian financial institutions and, more importantly, constant threat of more sanctions to come have led to higher funding costs, more acute risks profiles, lack of international assets diversification, and even payments problems, all of which reduce the banking sector ability to recover low quality and non-performing assets. The CBR has zero control over these factors.

Russia currently has 6 out of top 10 banks in CEE, according to The Banker rankings:


Source: http://www.thebanker.com/Banker-Data/Banker-Rankings/Top-1000-World-Banks-Russian-banks-mixed-fortunes-influence-CEE-ranking?ct=true.

These banks are systemic to the Russian economy, and only the U.S. sabre rattling is holding them back from being systemic in the broader CEE region. This is a shame, because opening up a banking channel to Russian economy greater integration into the global financial flows is a much more important bet on the future of democratisation and normalisation in Russia than any sanctions Washington can dream up.
 


As an aside, new developments in the now infamous Danske Bank case of laundering 'blood money' from Russia, relating to the Magnitzky case were reported this week in the EUObserver: https://euobserver.com/foreign/142286.

Friday, September 29, 2017

28/9/17: Pimco on Russian Economy: My Take


An interesting post about the Russian economy, quite neatly summarising both the top-line challenges faced and the resilience exhibited to-date via Pimco: https://blog.pimco.com/en/2017/09/Russia%20Growth%20Up%20Inflation%20Down. Worth a read.

My view: couple of points are over- and under-played somewhat.

Sanctions: these are a thorny issue in Moscow and are putting pressure on Russian banks operations and strategic plans worldwide. While they do take secondary seat after other considerations in public eye, Moscow insiders are quite discomforted by the effective shutting down of the large swathes of European markets (energy and finance), and North American markets (finance, technology and personal safe havens). On the latter, it is worth noting that a number of high profile Russian figures, including in pro-Kremlin media, have in recent years been forced to shut down shell companies previously operating in the U.S. and divest out of real estate assets. Sanctions are also geopolitical thorns in terms of limiting Moscow's ability to navigate the European policy space.

Banks: this issue is overplayed. Bailouts and shutting down of banks are imposing low cost on the Russian economy and are bearable, as long as inflationary pressures remain subdued. Moscow can recapitalise the banks it wants to recapitalise, so all and any banks that do end up going to the wall, e.g. B&N and Otkrytie - cited in the post - are going to the wall for a different reason. That reason is consolidation of the banking sector in the hands of state-owned TBTF banks that fits both the Central Bank agenda and the Kremlin agenda. The CBR has been on an active campaign to clear out medium- and medium-large banks out of the way both from macroprudential point of view (these institutions have been woefully undercapitalised and exposed to serious risks on assets side), and the financial system stability point of view (majority of these banks are parts of conglomerates with inter-linked and networked systems of loans, funds transfers etc).

Yurga, another bank that was stripped of its license in late July - is the case in point, it was part of a real estate and oil empire. B&N is another example: the bank was a part of the Safmar group with $34 billion worth of assets, from oil and coal to pension funds.

The CBR knowingly tightened the screws on these types of banks back in January:

  • The new rules placed a strict limit on bank’s exposure to its own shareholders - maximum of 20% of its capital, forcing the de-centralisation of equity holdings in banking sector; and
  • Restricted loans to any single borrower or group of connected borrowers to no more than 25% of total lending.
I cannot imagine that analysts covering Russian markets did not understand back in January that these rules will spell the end of many so-called 'pocket' banks linked to oligarchs and their business empires.

The balance of the banking sector is feeling the pain, but this pain is largely contained within the sector. Investment in Russian economy, usually heavily dependent on the banks loans, has been sluggish for a number of years now, but the key catalyst to lifting investment will be VBR's monetary policy and not the state of the banking sector. 

Here is a chart from Reuters summarising movements in interbank debt levels across the top 20 banks:


The chart suggests that net borrowing is rising amongst the top-tier banks, alongside deposits gains (noted by Pimco), so the core of the system is picking up strength off the weaker banks and is providing liquidity. Per NYU's v-lab data, both Sberbank and VTB saw declines in systemic risk exposures in August, compared to July. So overall, the banking system is a problem, but the problem is largely contained within the mid-tier banks and the CBR is likely to have enough fire power to sustain more banks going through a resolution. 


Sunday, August 13, 2017

12/8/17: Some growth optimism from the Russian regional data


An interesting note on the latest data updates for the Russian economy via Bofit.

Per Bofit: "Industrial output in Russian regions rises, while consumption gradually recovers." This is important, because regional recovery has been quite spotty and overall economic recovery has been dominated by a handful of regions and bigger urban centres.

"Industrial output growth continued in the first half of this year in all of Russia’s eight federal districts," with production up 1.5–2% y/y in the Northwest, Central and Volga Federal Districts, as well as in the Moscow city and region. St. Petersburg regional output rose 3-4% y/y.

An interesting observation is that during the recent recession, there has been no contraction in manufacturing and industrial output. Per Bofit: "Over the past couple of years, neither industrial output overall nor manufacturing overall has not contracted in any of Russia’s federal districts. Industrial output has even increased briskly in 2015–16 and this year in the Southern Federal
District due to high growth in manufacturing and in the Far East Federal District driven by growth in the mineral extraction industries."

This is striking, until you consider the nature of the 2014-2016 crisis: a negative shock of collapsing oil and raw materials prices was mitigated by rapid devaluation of the ruble. This cushioned domestic production costs and shifted more demand into imports substitutes. While investment drop off was sharp and negative on demand side for industrial equipment and machinery, it was offset by cost mitigation and improved price competitiveness in the domestic and exports markets.

Another aspect of this week's report is that Russian retail sales continue to slowly inch upward. Retail sales have been lagging industrial production during the first 12 months of the recovery. This is a latent factor that still offers significant upside to future growth in the later stages of the recovery, with investment lagging behind consumer demand.

Now, "retail sales have turned to growth, albeit slowly, in six [out of eight] federal districts."


Here is why these news matter. As I noted above, the recovery in Russian economy has three phases (coincident with three key areas of potential economic activity): industrial production, consumption and investment. The first stage - the industrial production growth stage - is on-going at a moderate pace. The 0.4-0.6 percent annual growth rate contribution to GDP from industrial production and manufacturing can be sustained without a major boom in investment. The second stage - delayed due to ruble devaluation taking a bite from the household real incomes - is just starting. This can add 0.5-1 percent in annual growth, implying that second stage of recovery can see growth of around 2 percent per annum. The next stage of recovery will involve investment re-start (and this requires first and foremost Central Bank support). Investment re-start can add another 0.2-0.3 percentage points to industrial production and a whole 1 percent or so to GDP growth on its own. Which means that with a shift toward monetary accommodation and some moderate reforms and incentives, Russian economy's growth potential should be closer to 3.3 percent per annum once the third stage of recovery kicks in and assuming the other two stages continue running at sustainable capacity levels.

However, until that happens, the economy will be stuck at around the rates of growth below 2 percent.

Saturday, December 5, 2015

5/12/15: Ruble converging to Urals... at last


After some strengthening in the second half of November, Russian Ruble continues to re-align with oil prices:

With current levels of Urals-Brent spread, Ruble has room to the downside still, at about 2-3 percent, taking it into 69.8-69.9 range. Which means the CBR has some room for raising foreign exchange reserves, but not much room...

Friday, August 28, 2015

28/8/15: CBR and Ruble: Fiscal Balance in Oil's Shadow


As I noted earlier this month, Russia has officially entered the recession. The key drivers for 3.4% contraction in 1H 2015 were the same as the key pressures on growth back in 2H 2014: oil prices, investment collapse on foot of high interest rates, inflationary environment that restricts CBR's room for cutting rates, and sanctions (or rather geopolitical risks and pressures, linked in part to sanctions).

That said, in June and early July there were some hopes for economy starting to stabilise, although fixed investment was down 7.1% y/y in June, marking 18th consecutive month of y/y declines. These are now once again under pressure and the cause is... oil price.

Here is how closely paired has Russian Ruble been to oil prices in trend terms since July 2014, although correlation was weaker in preceding period. Overall, as the chat shows, there are two very distinct periods of Ruble valuations catch up with oil prices: June 2014-February 2015 and mid-July 2015 through present.


Russia's Central Bank is switching between little concern for Ruble to interventions and back to staying out of the markets appears to be more than a simply random walk. Instead, it is a game consistent with rebalancing Ruble valuations to fit budgetary dynamics.

The reason for this is that (as shown in the chart above) Ruble strengthening above oil-linked fundamentals earlier this year was an actual threat to budgetary dynamics, and over the last couple of weeks, correcting valuations of Ruble re-established closer connection to oil prices. Hence, in July, CBR managed to deliver a shallower cut to interest rates (-50bps) compared to June (-100bps).

With CBR continuing to stick to its June 2016 forecast for inflation to fall to 'under 7%' by then and hit 4% in 2017 compared to July 2015 CPI at 15.6%, Russia went on to issue its first CPI-linked bonds / linkers amounting to RUB75 billion (OFZ-IN, 8 year notes) at 91% of nominal, on cover of RUB200 billion (more than 25% of demand coming from foreign investors). Real yield at issuance was 3.84% - relatively high-ish, implying underpricing of the bond in a market with relatively hefty demand and forward expectations for significant easing in inflation. Something is slightly amiss here.

In line with up-down interventions, the CBR continued to trend flat on foreign exchange reserves. End of June, total Russian FX reserves stood at USD361.575 billion, and by end of July these fell to USD357.626 billion. As of last week, the reserves were back up at USD364.6 billion.


Weekly data from CBR does not allow for compositional analysis of reserves, but looking at the monthly data the pattern repeats.


Actual liquid FX reserves and gold stood at USD347.1 billion at the end of July against USD350.957 billion at the end of June. This is barely up on end-April period low of USD345.373 billion, although well within the FX- and gold-valuations range of change.

Meanwhile, data through July 2015 shows net purchases of dollars of USD3.76 billion against USD3.831 billion in June and USD2.531 billion in May by CBR. Overall, from January 2015 through July 2015, CBR bought (net) USD7.8 billion and there were no net purchases/sales of euro.


All of the above suggests that CBR will likely resume rate cuts if Ruble firms up from its recent valuations. Two weeks ago, RUB/USD was at 64.947 (72.197 to Euro), peaking at 70.887 four days ago (82.373 to the Euro) and currently at 66.8875 (74.984 to Euro), not exactly warranting a move by the CBR yet, but back in the relative comfort zone for the Bank to sit on its hands once again.

Saturday, August 15, 2015

15/8/15: Russian External Debt: Big Deleveraging, Smaller Future Pressures


Readers of this blog would have noted that in the past I referenced Russian companies cross-holdings of own debt in adjusting some of the external debt statistics for Russia. As I explained before, large share of the external debt owed by banks and companies is loans and other debt instruments issued by their parents and subsidiaries and direct equity investors - in other words, it is debt that can be easily rolled over or cross-cancelled within the company accounts.

This week, Central Bank of Russia did the same when it produced new estimate for external debt maturing in September-December 2015. The CBR excluded “intra-group operations” and the new estimate is based on past debt-servicing trends and a survey of 30 largest companies.

As the result of revisions, CBR now estimates that external debt coming due for Russian banks and non-financial corporations will be around USD35 billion, down on previously estimated USD61 billion.

CBR also estimated cash and liquid foreign assets holdings of Russian banks and non-bank corporations at USD135 billion on top of USD20 billion current account surplus due (assuming oil at USD40 pb) and USD14 billion of CBR own funds available for forex repo lending.

Here are the most recent charts for Russian external debt maturity, excluding most recent update for corporate and banks debt:



As the above table shows, in 12 months through June 2015, Russian Total External Debt fell 24%, down USD176.6 billion - much of it due to devaluation of the ruble and repayments of maturing debt. Of this, Government debt is down USD22.1 billion or 39% - a huge drop. Banks managed to deleverage out of USD59.9 billion in 12 months through June 2015 (down 29%) and Other Sectors external liabilities were down USD88.8 billion (-20%).

These are absolutely massive figures indicating:
1) One of the underlying causes of the ongoing economic recession (contracting credit supply and debt repayments drag on investment and consumer credit);
2) Strengthening of corporate and banks' balance sheets; and
3) Overall longer term improvement in Russian debt exposures.


Tuesday, August 11, 2015

11/8/15: Russian 2Q growth: beating forecasts on the wrong side


With apologies for a slight delay (I am actually away from work these weeks), here is a quick update on Russian 2Q 2015 GDP figures.

Those who read my musings on the Russian economy would recall that in recent months we have been seeing some signs of stabilisation in the economy performance, albeit I have been reluctant to call these signs a full turnaround as data required robustness confirmation and broadening of any improvements.

Good thing I stayed more cautious on the matter of calling a recovery. In 1Q 2015, Russian economy shrunk 2.2% y/y, surprising on the positive side the consensus expectation of a 3.7% drop. However, this time around, 2Q 2015 preliminary estimate for real GDP growth came in at 4.6%, worse than consensus forecast for 4.5%.

Now, 0.1 percentage points on expectation is not quite ugly, but -4.6% is ugly. Thus, in itself, the 2Q 2015 figure does not quite put under sever pressure the expected 3.4-3.6% annual contraction for 2015 as a whole, but it does put question marks around the thesis of Russian economy's recovery.

The contraction in 2Q takes us into July-August when oil prices have fallen even further and ruble devaluation pressures returned - both making it hard for the CBR to cut rates to support economy.

Noticeably, acceleration in the decline can be seen in q/q seasonally-adjusted figures. These are yet to be released, but Capital Economics shows estimates of 2.5% q/q decline in real GDP on seasonally adjusted basis, nearly double the rate of contraction (1.3% q/q) recorded in 1Q 2015.

The charts below show just how ugly 2Q 2015 figures are on a historical perspective:

 and over the shorter horizon:

Source: both: Capital Economics

As noted by Barclays, much of the deterioration in growth in 2Q was down to oil prices

 Source: @Schuldensuehner

Although in terms of pressures on growth, consumption component of the Domestic demand remains weak.
Source: @Schuldensuehner

The CBR policy rates are clearly weighing on the consumption and investment ability to rebound, with high policy rate (11%) compounding already tight funding markets for the banks, resulting in very high cost of credit.

We have no details on the GDP figure breakdown, yet, but Capital Economics suggested that based on 2Q headline figure, household expenditure fell at a rate similar to 1Q 2015 (-8.9%). Which implies that it was industrial production that drove growth figures further down in 2Q 2015.

The latter point is consistent with the evidence from Manufacturing PMIs in recent months:


So what's the top level conclusion from all of this? 2Q was ugly. Signs of stabilisation in the economy are still present, but robustness of these signals is now more under question than a week ago. In simple terms, we will need to see Q3 data posting closer to 0% change in GDP and beating 1Q 2015 reading, if we are to confirm expectation for growth recovery in 4Q 2015 - 1Q 2016. 

Thursday, June 18, 2015

18/6/15: Russian Central Bank Targets Rebuilding of Foreign Reserves


Recently, speaking at a banking conference in St Petersburg, Elvira Nabiullina, head of the Central Bank of Russia outlined the CBR position on foreign exchange reserves. Nabiullina note that Russian reserves are large - sufficient to cover almost 11 months of imports. However, Nabiullina's 'comfort zone' target for the reserves to cover 2-3 years of "substantial capital outflows", implying she would like to see Russian reserves rising back to USD500 billion mark. Nabiullina is now targeting purchases of forex over the next few years to drive up reserves and to that objective she has been buying on average USD200mln worth of forex per day since mid-May.

In line with forex reserves rebuilding objective, Nabiullina cautioned about markets expectations of further large scale cuts to interest rates as the CBR is trying to balance out inflation targeting (requiring tighter monetary policy), investment supports (requiring looser policy) and accumulation of reserves (implying looser policy).

Per Nabiullina: "Attempts to reduce the interest rates too fast or even acquire certain assets may simply lead to stronger inflation, to an outflow of capital or to dollarisation of the economy, and that would slow down the economic growth, other than promote it."

In its latest outlook, CBR forecast unemployment reaching 6.5% this year from the current rate of 5.6%, before falling to 5.6-5.8% by 2018. GDP is expected to shrink 3.2% in 2015, returning to trend growth of 1.7-2.4% around 2017-2018. Inflation is expected to hit 11% at the end of 2015 with rather optimistic outlook for a decline to "less than 7%" by June 2016, and "close to the target level" of 4% in 2017.

Net capital outflows are expected to decline from USD90 billion in 2015 to USD55-65 billion in 2018. "We are expecting the financial sanctions against Russia to remain in place. Payments on foreign debts during this period will constitute the bulk of the capital outflow. It will gradually reduce from $90 billion to about $55-65 billion during 2015-2018, depending on the scenario," according to Nabiullina.

Russian International Reserves reached USD360.6 billion at the end of last week, up on USD356 billion low registered in April 2015. Still, the reserves are down USD117.7 billion y/y (-24.6%) and down USD132.73 billion (-26.9%) on pre-sanctions period.



Monday, June 15, 2015

15/6/15: CBR Cuts Rates to 11.5% in Hope of Lifting Sagging Investment


Central Bank of Russia cut policy rate to 11.5% today from 12.5%, undershooting markets expectation for a 150bps cut to 11.0%. The move was expected and relatively modest cut this time around suggests more heavy cuts in 2H 2015. In part, this reflects relatively sharp decline in growth in April: having contracted modest 1.9% in 1Q 2015, Russian GDP fell at an annual rate of 4.2% in April. Another incentive for CBR to lower rates is the Ruble, which posted surprising comeback in early 2015, putting new pressure on the federal budget. CBR bough USD3.6 billion in May, in an attempt to keep Ruble lower.

Rate cut is a welcome move, but in current environment it also shows just how little room for manoeuvre the monetary policy has. Russian banks are deleveraging. Loans outstanding in the corporate and household sectors have fallen in 1Q 2015. The trend continued in April: SME loans share of total corporate loans fell from 22% in April 2014 to 18% in April 2015. In January-April 2015, corporate lending outstanding was up nominally 17% in ruble terms compared to the same period 2014. Inflation run at around 15.8%, which means that in real terms, corporate loans remained basically flat. Household loans grew by 4% y/y in ruble terms. Which means in real term, level of outstanding loans to households fell. As usual, roughly 1/3 of all corporate loans were denominated in foreign currency.

The rate cut will also help with non-performing loans. Stock of NPLs in the corporate sector rose by roughly 30% y/y in the first four months of 2015 to 6% of the total stock of corporate loans. Household credit NPLs stood at 7%. Both rates of NPLs are relatively benign, by Western standards, but the growth rate in NPLs is worrying. Lower cost of carrying these loans will help alleviate some of the pressures.

Overall, Russian investment remains a major bottleneck for the economy. Chart below shows Russian Investment as percentage of GDP, compared to both the Emerging Asia economies and Emerging Europe economies. This clearly highlights the dire state of Russian investment over 2000-2013, and a significant decline in investment from 2014 on, including the IMF forecasts for 2015-2020 period.


Sunday, May 24, 2015

24/5/2015: Russian Economy: Weaker April Signals Renewed Risks


When I remarked recently on some less negative than expected developments in Russian economy over Q1 2015, I noted that these were fragile signs of potential stabilisation and that the risks remain to the downside. April industrial production appears to signal the same. April industrial production numbers are down 4.5% y/y and manufacturing is down 7% - the rates of decline that are significantly sharper than recovered over 1Q.

Remember that Russian GDP fell 1.9% in 1Q 2015 y/y, based on preliminary estimates - a decline that is shallower than what was expected by the analysts. Overall output (GDP at factor cost) fell slightly more sharply - by 2.3% over the same time, while domestic demand (Consumption + Investment) fell at just under 7%. The gap between output and domestic demand declines can be in part explained by imports substitution going on across a number of sectors, such as food, agriculture, industry and manufacturing, plus improved trade volumes also driven by ruble devaluation.

The decline in industrial production and manufacturing signals a feed through from collapsing investment to production sectors, as well as continued weakness in consumption and strengthening of the ruble. More significantly, ruble firming up is not helping imports substitution-driven demand. CBR has now returned to buying forex and selling ruble in order to, both, increase its reserves and also sustain lower ruble. Higher ruble valuations hurt fiscal balance and at the same time inducing weaker external balances. As the result, CBR is now regularly purchasing USD100-200 million daily and is raising cost on banks' access to repo facilities.

All in - just another reminder that the Russian economy is not out of the woods yet. For all the positive developments in recent months, the situation remains fragile and structural drivers for growth are still lacking, so any recovery, if sustained, will have to come from either external demand factors (oil prices, commodities prices, etc) and/or imports substitution effect supported by lower CBR rates.

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

15/4/15: Russian Foreign Exchange Reserves


Few weeks ago, based on the three weeks data from the Central Bank, I noted an improvement in Russian Forex reserves, while warning that this requires a number of weekly observations to the upside to confirm any reversal in the downward trend.

Now, with monthly data available for the full month of March, my concerns about temporary nature of improvements have been confirmed. Full month of March data shows a decline, not a rise, in forex reserves. Specifically, total reserves dipped from USD360.221 billion at the end of February to USD356.365 billion at the end of March - a m/m decline of USD3.856 billion.


Now, in monthly terms, March decline was the smallest since October 2014 and the second smallest (after September 2014) in 17 months. Nonetheless, forex reserves are now down to the levels of March-April 2007, having fallen USD129.766 billion y/y (-26.7%). Over the period of sanctions, total reserves are down USD136.961 billion (-27.8%). Over Q1 2015 the reserves are down USD29.095 billion.

Month on month, foreign exchange reserves (combining foreign exchange, SDRs and reserve position in the iMF) are down USD4.338 billion, with USD3.646 billion of this decline coming from foreign exchange alone. Gold holdings are up USD482 million month on month.

Gold, as percentage of total reserves, currently stands at 13.265%, the highest since November 2000. Gold holdings performed well for Russia over the period of this crisis, rising USD3.917 billion year on year through March 2015 (+9%) and up USD2.684 million since the start of the sanctions.

In terms of liquid cash reserves, foreign exchange holdings are down at USD298.665 billion at the end of March 2015, a level comparable to January-February 2007. end of March figure represents a decline of USD131.024 billion y/y (-30.5%) and the decline during the period of the sanctions is even steeper at USD136.9 billion (-31.4%).




Good news: Russian economy is past the 2015 peak of external debt redemptions (see: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/14415-russian-external-debt-redemptions.html).

Bad news: there is another USD54 billion worth of external debt that will need repaying (net of easy inter-company roll overs) in Q2-Q4 2015. Worse news: Q1 declines in foreign reserves comes with CBR not intervening in the Ruble markets.

Good news: capital flight is slowing down.

Bad news: capital flight is still at USD32.6 billion over Q1 2015 (http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian-capital-flight-slows-sharply-in-first-quarter/518927.html) although much of that is down to debt redemptions.

Which means there is little room for manoeuvre anywhere in sight - should the macroeconomic conditions deteriorate or a run on the Ruble return, there is a very much diminishing amount of reserves available to deploy. Enough for now, but declining…

As I said before: watch incoming risks.

Saturday, April 11, 2015

11/4/15: BOFIT on Ruble Rise Debate


Yesterday I posted some thoughts on Ruble appreciation over recent months http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/10415rubles-mysterious-rise-some.html. Here is last night's BOFIT note on the same, highlighting CBR repo arrangements as the policy tool also contributing to changes in the trend:


Friday, April 10, 2015

10/4/15:Ruble's Mysterious Rise: Some Thoughts


There is an interesting debate starting up around the Ruble: in recent weeks, Ruble appreciation against the USD has pushed it out of its traditional long term alignment with oil prices, as noted in the chart below:



Source: @Schuldensuehner 

There are several possible factor that can account for this.

  1. Oil price expectations - if the markets expect oil prices to rise further, Ruble buyers can bid the currency up ahead of the oil price changes. This is unlikely in my view, as we are not seeing oil price firming significantly in both spot and futures markets.
  2. Oil price revelation - if the markets priced in severe forecasts uncertainty linked to oil price dynamics to the Russian economy back in October-December 2014, then the new information about Russian economy's performance in Q1 2015 should lead to re-pricing of risks. In my opinion, Ruble was heavily oversold in December (not in october-November) and there is some upside potential, given that the Q1 2015 data coming out of the Russian economy is not as apocalyptic as some currency markets analysts expected. Notably, there has been a significant cut in USD long positions vis-a-vis Ruble in recent days, which signals speculative re-alignment toward long-Ruble.
  3. Demand Factor 1 - March is the end of Q1, so it is the month of rising demand for Ruble to cover corporate tax liabilities (Russian corporates pay taxes in Rubles). VAT receipts are also coming due. And estimated forward taxes and charges. In my opinion, this helps to temporarily boost Ruble valuations.
  4. Demand Factor 2 - March is the last month before major companies in Russia are due to reverse their forex holdings to October 2014 levels (per December agreement hammered out by President Putin). This means increased supply of USD and other currencies, and increased demand for Rubles. Again, a temporary factor, in my opinion.
  5. Supply Factor - March and April are also large months for corporates to book in energy-related exports earnings. Note that Russian Central Bank is recording a small rise in reserves in late March, followed by a decline in April.
  6. Demand Factor 3 - March also was the month of largest (for 2015) external debt redemptions by Russian banks and corporates. Repayment of these debts involves buying dollars and selling Rubles, but timing-wise, companies have been pre-building their forex reserves for some time, so it is most likely that in recent 3 weeks there has been less demand for dollars (and other forex) than in previous 2 months. Note, I covered this here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/8415-rubles-gains-are-convincing-but.html
  7. Demand factor 4 - since the start of 2014, Russia actively pursued reduction of the degree of dollarisation in its economy. The first stage of this process involved increasing trade settlements in other currencies (most recent one - announced this week - with Indonesia). This, alongside with imports collapse, reduced external trade-linked demand for dollars. The second phase of de-dollarisation started in February, when Russian retail deposits started exiting dollars and shifting back into Ruble on improved confidence in the banks and high deposit rates. Again - a temporary support for the Ruble.
  8. Demand factor 5 - as Russian CDS show, probability of default declines for Russia sustained in recent weeks implies improved demand for Russian Government (and local) bonds, issued in Ruble markets. The result is improved demand for OFZs and, thus, for Ruble. 
  9. Real vs Nominal exchange Rates - inflation dynamics in Russia are most likely drawing a gap between real and nominal exchange rates, so nominal rate firming up is not imposing equivalent increase in the real rates. 

In other words, we have many, many moving parts to one equation. One can't tell the dominant one, or which are likely to last longer, but my sense is that majority of these forces are temporary and the long-run link between Ruble and oil price will be regained.

Now, assuming oil price dynamics remain where they are today (weak upside), Ruble is likely to devalue again, back to USD/RUB 55-57 range. If inflation does not fall toward 10% in Q2 2015 (and I do not think it will), we are likely to see Ruble move into USD/RUB 60-65 range over this quarter. On the other hand, improved outlook for the economy (signalling, say annual contraction closer to 3.5-4 percent) can see Ruble staying within the USD/RUB 50-53 range.

One thing is for sure: so far, the Central Bank of Russia has managed damn well its dance in a very tight monetary policy corner between runaway inflation, prohibitively high interest rates and a massive squeeze on forex valuations. How long this 'smart game' in multidimensional and highly dynamic chess can go on is everyone's guess.

Saturday, April 4, 2015

4/4/15: A Sign of Ruble Stabilisation? Russian Forex Reserves Rise


The latest data (through last week) published two days ago by the Central Bank of Russia shows that Russian Forex reserves have risen for the second week in a row. In the week of 27/03/2015 Forex reserves rose USD7.9 billion to USD360.8 billion and in the week prior they were up USD1.2 billion. Thus, relative to the crisis period low of USD351.7 billion set in the week of 13/03/2015, Russian Forex reserves are up USD9.1 billion. This puts weekly reserves at USD2.2 billion below end of February reading.



This is a very uncertain development at this point in time. Russian Forex reserves were down 15 consecutive weeks prior to the last two weeks of increases, so it is too early to read the latest upticks as reversal of the trend, but it is pretty clear that, for now, things have stabilised somewhat.

Monthly data, not yet fully available, but reflective of the last week results, suggests that the aggregate reserves are slightly up m/m. At the end of March, Forex reserves at USD360.8 billion appear to be up USD579 million on the end of February.

In the year through the end of March 2015, the reserves are down USD125.33 billion (-25.8%) and on the start of the sanctions, these are down USD132.53 billion (-26.9%). Q1 2015 (end of quarter) reserves are down USD24.66 billion on end of Q4 2014. In other words, we need to see several more weeks of improved reserves before we can call a new trend.




Monday, March 16, 2015

16/3/2015: Some new 2015-2018 forecasts for the Russian Economy


Amidst much of the (occasionally informed) speculation as to the whereabouts of Russian President Putin (see for example this rather informative piece: http://uk.businessinsider.com/what-is-putin-doing-2015-3?r=US#ixzz3UWqOOHLc), President Putin has finally reappeared from wherever he might have been over the last how-many days... Of course, his reappearance promptly led to some 'highly informed' Western analysts seeing President Putin's double...

The matters of conspiracy aside (for their endless supply makes their value trend toward absolute zero pretty fast), the Economy Ministry has been busy preparing new forecasts for Russia for 2016, trailing behind the recent forecasts from the Central Bank.

Minister Ulyukaev today said that the economic outlook for Russia is based on the view that Western sanctions will remain in place "at least over the period of 2015-2016" and "most likely, in the following years". Beyond this, the Minister said that 2016-2018 will likely see 2.5%-3% average rate of growth in real GDP and that 2016 growth is likely to be in the same range. New forecasts, according to Mr. Ukyukaev - currently in preparation stages - see economic recovery starting in 2016. This, if confirmed in the official forecasts, would represent a dose of optimism not matched by many independent analysts, and well in excess of the cautious gloom of the Central Bank (see below).

Meanwhile, as The Moscow Times (not a paper known for expressing pro-Kremlin sentiments) noted: foreign investors are heading back into Russian markets http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/517481.html. I wish them well - they are in for a rough ride, but should enjoy some upside, on average. Do note some of the risks and concerns voiced at the end of the article.

Of course, amidst all this positivity, the real signs are pointing to growing concerns about the state of the economy.

Central Bank published forecasts show "at risk scenario" forecast of -5.8% contraction in GDP in 2015. This assumes average oil prices in the range of USD40-45pb.

Under the base scenario, oil prices are expected to average USD50-55pb in 2015, rising to USD60-65pb in 2016 and USD70-75pb in 2017. These assumptions support GDP growth forecast of -3.4% to -4.0% in 2015, followed by a contraction of -1.0% to -1.6% in 2016, and growth of 5.5% to 6.3% in 2017. In effect, these forecasts imply 2015-2017 growth of between 0.4% and 0.9%, cumulative. Under the base scenario, growth of 4.6% in 2017 would be required to get Russian economy back to the end-2014 levels.

The CBR forecasts decline of USD50 billion in its forex reserves to around USD307 billion in 2015 and no change in reserves in 2016. The balancing out of reserves is based on current account surplus forecast of USD90 billion in 2016 up on USD64 billion in 2015. CBR projects current account surplus of USD119 billion in 2017.

My view is that the above figures err on optimistic side. I expect Russian economy to shrink by around 4-5% in 2015, post GDP growth of between -1.5% to +0.5% in 2016 and grow by around 3% in 2017. I also expect CBR forex reserves to drop by around USD80 billion in 2015 and closer to USD40-50 billion in 2016 to USD225-230 billion at the end of 2017.



Note: a fascinating and exhaustingly detailed account of the short history of Russian Government and business struggles for who will be building the bridge to Crimea: http://www.forbes.ru/print/node/282637 (in Russian).

Saturday, January 24, 2015

24/1/2015: CB of Russia Recent Interventions


In 2014, Central Bank of Russia spent USD83 billion on currency interventions, against total draw down of USD124 billion in foreign reserves held. At the end of 2014, CBR’s foreign currency reserves, including gold, were USD386 billion, down from USD510 billion at the beginning of 2014. As of December figures, Russian foreign exchange reserves rank 6th largest in the world, providing a cover for more than 15 months of imports at current running rate.

In first half of January, CBR spend some USD2.2 billion on currency markets interventions, issued foreign exchange repos for the amount of USD8.3 billion, with most of this (USD5.4 billion) in 28- and 365-day maturities.

Sunday, January 11, 2015

11/1/2015: Ending 2014 with a Bang: Russian Inflation & Ruble Crisis


Couple footnotes to 2014, covering Russian economic situation. Much is already known, but worth repeating and tallying up for the full year stats.

Ruble crisis with its most recent up and down swings took its toll on both currency valuations and inflation. Over 2014, based on the rate tracked by the Central Bank of Russia, the ruble was down 34% against the euro and 42% against the USD. The gap reflects depreciation of the euro against the USD.

Virtually all of this relates to one core driver: oil prices. In 2014, Brent prices lost 48% of their values and Urals grade lost 52% of its value. Urals is generally slightly cheaper than Brent, but current gap suggest relatively oversold Urals. It is a bit of a 'miracle' of sorts that Ruble failed to completely trace Urals down, but overall, you can see the effect oil price has - overriding all other considerations, including capital flight and sanctions.

Ruble valuations took their toll on Moscow Stock Exchange - RTS index, expressed in USD, lost 43% of its value, reaching levels comparable to Q1 2009 (791 at the end of 2014, from 1,388 at the start of January 2014).

And ruble crisis pushed inflation well ahead of 5% short term target from CBR set for 2014. Preliminary estimates for December put inflation at 11.4%, with food inflation at 15% (7.3% in 2013), goods (ex-food) at 8% (4.5% in 2013) and services at 10% (8% in 2013). M/m inflation hit 2.6% in December 2014 - the highest since January 2005). Overall inflation was 6.5% in 2013, 6.6% in 2012, 6.1% in 2011 and 2010 and 8.8% in 2009. Last time Russian inflation hit double digit figures was in 2008 - at 13.3%.

Comment via BOFIT: "The pick-up in inflation at the end of the year reflected the ruble’s sharp depreciation and the ensuing frenzy of household spending. Following the ban on certain categories of food imports last autumn, food prices have risen even if no food shortage has actually emerged." Most of this is pretty much as reported. One point worth highlighting - lack of shortages, which is contrary to some of the hype paraded in the media about Russians suffering greatly from diminished supplies and stores running out of goods.

Again per BOFIT: "Representatives of food producers and retail chains committed in September to a government initiative that their members would not raise prices without good reason or create artificial shortages in the market. There has been no move by the government as yet to impose price controls as in 2010. The agreement could have limited price increases somewhat."

And a chart from the same source illustrating pick up in inflation:

Update: Some more numbers on inflation: Meat prices were up 20.1% in 2014, having posted deflation of 3% in 2013; fish prices were up 19.1% in 2014, a big jump on 7.6% inflation in 2013. Cereals are up 34.6% against 3.2% in 2013.


Sunday, January 4, 2015

4/1/2015: Russian Economy Update


As I noted earlier, Russian economy posted an estimated decline in real GDP of 0.5% in November for the first time since 2009, while Russian inflation accelerated to 11.4% y/y in December, up from 9.1% in November. Latest guesses for economic growth in 2015: -4.0% at average crude prices of USD60 bbl via Finance Minister, Siluanov. Previous estimate by CBR consistent with this oil price level was 4.5-4.7% contraction.

To reduce inflationary pressures and to alleviate 'precautionary demand' (stockpiling) of some core goods, the Government is considering imposing a freeze on some food prices, according to Andrei Tsiganov, deputy head of the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service.

Still, according to CBR First Deputy Governor Ksenia Yudaeva, long term inflation target remains in place at 4% by the end of 2017. Good luck to that…

Largest driver for inflation was mid-December Ruble crisis (December 16-17). While Ruble posted some recovery in subsequent days, it came at a hefty price tag for the Russian foreign exchange reserves and Ruble resumed slide last week as CBR refrained from intervening in the markets from December 22nd.

Key driver for the upside of the Ruble has been, in addition to aggressive interventions by the CBR, the decision on December 17th to mandate five largest Russian state-owned enterprises: Gazprom, Rosneft, Alrosa, Zarubezhneft, and Kristall to reduce their foreign exchange holdings to the levels of October 2014. The deadline for this is March 2015. The companies will report their forex levels on a weekly basis. Behind the scenes, President Putin started discussions with larger private enterprises to also reduce their forex deposits.

Talking about deposits, to reduce pressure on retail banks, Duma passed the legislation to raise deposit insurance coverage from RUB700,000 to RUB1.4 million on December 19th. Russian Finance Ministry supported the bill, having previously resisted smaller increase. On corporate funding side, CBR announced, on December 23rd, new forex credit lines of 28-days and 365-days basis.

Saturday, December 20, 2014

20/12/2014: Russia's Black Monday: The Debate is On


It is a hazardous task to attempt to explain fast spikes in Forex markets pressures during the ongoing currency crises. And hence few attempt. One very interesting - and I suspect rather correct - try is by Sergei Guriev http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ruble-collapse-corporate-debt-by-sergei-guriev-2014-12.

Guriev directly links the Russian Ruble's Black Monday (and I would add Black Tuesday too) on Rosneft debt redemption that takes place this weekend.

He is right on all points, including, probably, the suspicion that CBR delayed rate hike to allow Rosneft debt deal to go through, with a caveat.

The hike of November 11th (see my note on this here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/11122014-central-bank-of-russia-good.html) was weak. Weak by all fundamentals metrics, save one and a very important one: CBR knew at the hike time that the industrial activity was tanking and investment was starting to lose steam (if anaemic growth in investment to-date can be called that). So CBR delayed hike most likely for two reasons:

  1. Rosneft deal; and
  2. The fact that raising rates are hammering the economy (Governor Nabiullina clearly stated as much on several previous occasions and Professor Guriev might be reading too much into the statement by the Minister of Economy, Alexey Ulyukaev - Ulyukaev is locked into a long-term battle with CBR - see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/09/1292014-bank-of-russia-leaves-rates.html In fact, earlier this year, the Ministry was openly critical of CBR for the Bank lifting rates without 'coordination' with the Ministry).
Another point ignored by Guriev (predictably for an economist) is the dynamics-driven algos and shorts rebalancing that most likely came quickly into the market late Monday and continued to hammer Ruble on Tuesday.

But, on the net, the point that Rosneft debt is costing Russia dearly is on the money. And it will continue doing so into 2015 when the company debt redemptions are likely to hit 1/5th of the total corporate and banks' redemptions.

Do note, more granular analysis of the redemptions, putting to challenge some of Guriev's statements, is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/19122014-plight-of-russian-banks.html

Tuesday, December 16, 2014

16/12/2014: Russian Inflation: Hot, but Hardly a Meltdown, yet...


While everyone is chasing tails of Ruble (or Rouble / Rubel / Roubel and any other toungue-twisting permutation), here is one fact on the Russian economy:

Russian 12-month inflation was running above 9% at the end of November. 

Sounds a lot. In fact, as I am typing this, one UK news report is referencing Russian inflation and telling us that if the UK were to experience such, there would have been panic. Right...

Truth is, Russia is accustomed to inflation at 7% - whether it is a positive marker or not, it is simply a fact - so 9% is a bit less of a drama than one might expect. However, end-November food price inflation is 12.6% y/y and non-food inflation is at 6%. The latter is benign, but likely to rise more. The former is a bit of concern, as Russian crops hit nearly historical records this year. Admittedly, it takes time for field-to-table route to be completed, but… According to the economy minister Alexei Ulyukayev, roughly 4% of the above inflation is down to Ruble depreciation (so expect more pressure here when December CPI is out), but 2.5% is down to imports bans under Russian counter-sanctions. Slightly confusing the message, Ulyukayev's deputy estimated that around 2.4% of full year inflation will come courtesy of Ruble devaluations (again, this will have to be revised up now). 

Expectations forward are not rosy. I expect inflation to hit 10% before year-end and roll over that number in Q1 2015. CBR, meanwhile, expects it to be close to, but below 10% mark in Q1 2015. Many analysts and the CBR expect inflation to moderate in Q2 2015. I doubt that. It will be sticky to the upside, likely North of 12%. 

And the crucial marker for the entire 2015 will be the 2015 crop, not estimates, but actual output, which - judging by cyclicality - is not going to be as good as this year's one.

Here's a neat chart plotting Russian CPI from 2005 on, courtesy of BOFIT. 


Source: BOFIT

Do tell me again that the current inflation rates are a 'meltdown'… though one still has to recognise they are a concern.

Meanwhile, last week revised economic forecasts by Russian Economy Ministry were factoring in USD80 bbl Ural's price of oil for 2015. Sounds outrageously high? Not really: Brent consensus forecast by IEA-polled economists produces the expectation slightly above that. With this price assumed, Russian economy is forecast to shrink by 0.8% in 2015. Again, you might think that the world is collapsing, if you are to read current headlines related to the run on the Ruble, but let me remind you that euro area economy shrunk by 1.08% in 2012-2013 and last time I checked, Frankfurt is still around.

Russia desperately needs some breathing space on the funding markets side. And it needs to stop capital flight. If it finds solutions to these twin problems, it can weather the storm.

Note: I was asked today on Irish radio to comment on the effects of the Russian crisis on Europe and Ireland. Here is a summary of my view:

Continued currency crisis in Russia presents risks to the European economy hard to estimate.

Russian imports of goods and services are likely to contract by between 12 and 15 percent in 2015, with much of this effect being driven by decline in capital goods and consumer goods imported traditionally from Europe. Second order effect is ongoing substitution of Russian imports away from Europe and in favour of Asia Pacific as a source of goods. This means that the impact on Russian demand for exports from Europe is likely to be even stronger.

In addition, financial exposures to Russia run high in Austria, Italy, France and the UK. While the European banks have strengthened of their balancesheets in recent months, another adverse shock to their assets base is not something they would like to contemplate. While it will not be a sector-defining event, continued deterioration in Russian assets valuations will not be helping.

The big unknown - Russian response to current pressures - is yet another risk factor no one in Europe needs. If Russia opts for capital controls and/or imposes a holiday on repayment of larger debt tranches coming due in H1 2015, European financial system will receive another shock as much of Russian banks and corporate funding was underwritten in Europe.

In simple economic terms, everyone around the world would benefit from Russia stepping off the financial precipice line as soon as possible.