Showing posts with label Eurozone banks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Eurozone banks. Show all posts

Sunday, September 28, 2014

28/9/2014: Euro area banks deposits: no sign of significant improvements


Courtesy of @cigolo - a nice chart summing up trends in deposits in Euro area banks from 2009 through Q2 2014:


Italy and Slovenia are two countries that managed to raise the deposit levels in their banking system from Q1 2009. Portugal suffered a decline in deposits off the peak, but stayed above 2009 levels. In every other country sampled, deposits fell from 2009 levels. Note: Ireland too suffered a decline in deposits and in fact, once we control for the reclassifications in deposits, the decline has been more dramatic than the one depicted in the chart (see details here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/09/2792014-growth-just-not-in-irish.html).

Since the Cypriot bailout, and the introduction of bail-in clause for depositors, Euro area banks deposits stayed basically flat in Italy (with slight decline in trend) and Greece, rose in Slovenia, posted a shallow increase in Portugal, declined in Ireland and Spain, collapsed further in Cyprus. While there was no immediately obvious common trend, deposits pre-Cypriot bailout trend was disrupted or failed to improve in Italy, Slovenia, Cyprus, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Greece despite numerous efforts to shore up the fallout from the bail-ins under the new systems set up for the European Banking Union.

So much for reformed banking sectors, then. Remember that funding in European banks should be shifting toward more reliance on 'organic' sources, e.g. deposits, than on interbank lending. We are yet to see this happening on any appreciable scale across the 'peripheral' economies.

Tuesday, August 23, 2011

23/08/2011: July Banks Survey - Euro area credit supply - Expectations

3 months forward expectations for lending conditions in Euro area, based on July 2011 data from the Banks Lending Survey run by ECB indicate that:
  • Overall lending standards by Euro area banks are expected to tighten in 3 months following July 2011 by 9% of survey respondents - a number that has been rising now consecutively for 3 quarters.
  • Overall lending standards are expected to ease by just 2% of survey respondents, down from 5% reporting back in April 2011.
  • The respondents expect virtually no change in lending conditions for SMEs
  • Lending to large enterprises is expected to tighten over the next 3 months by 10% of the banks surveyed, while only 3% are expecting lending to ease.

23/08/2011: July Banks Survey - Euro area credit supply - costs & controls

In the previous two posts I looked at the supply of credit to enterprises and the core drivers for changes in banks lending within the Euro area over the 3 months through July 2011. Here is a quick snapshot of what these changes mean on the ground.

The survey question this relates to is: Over the past three months, how have your bank's conditions and terms for approving loans or credit lines to enterprises changed?
  • Bank margins on average loans to enterprises have tightened across 19% of the banks in 3 months through July 2011, while 18% of the banks reported easing of the average margins. Thus, overall margins remained largely unchanged across 57% of the banks - same as in 3 months to April 2011. However, in 3 months to April 2011, the percentage of the banks reporting easing of conditions on margins exceeded the percentage of the banks reporting tightening by 3 percentage points. This compares against zero percentage points differential in 3 months through July 2011 (note - these are adjusted percentages, compensating for respondents' errors).
  • Number of the banks reporting tightening of margins on riskier loans exceeded numbers reporting easing by 23 percentage points in 3 months to July 2011.
  • Non-interest rates charges have tightened in 2 percentage points more banks than eased
  • Size of the loans granted tightened in 7% of the banks and eased in 3%, with 84% reporting no change in 3 months through July 2011.
  • Collateral requirements have become tighter in 6% of the banks, while the requirements eased in 4%, suggesting de-accelerating rate of collateral requirements barriers growth.
  • There was tightening of loans covenants reported by 9% of the banks and 6% reported easing. In previous quarter, the comparable numbers were 5% and 4%, implying tighter covenants are getting tougher.

While margins and non-interest rate charges are running at virtually no change since early 2010, there is a slight uptick in pressures in these credit costs. Collateral requirements remain on moderating tighter path, while riskier loans are posting second consecutive quarter of tightening of the margins.

Overall, these responses paint a mixed picture of costs of the bank lending to enterprises and suggests that market funding and capital and liquidity concerns drive banks lending dynamics in the Euro area, rather than costs and conditions structures.

22/08/2011: July Banks Survey - Euro area credit supply - drivers

In the previous post I highlighted some new developments in Euro area banks lending to the SMEs and larger enterprises (post link here). In this post, let us consider the data (through July) from the ECB's Banks Lending Survey for the core drivers of the structural stagnation and renewed weaknesses that have emerged in the Euro area credit supply.

The survey question we are considering here is: "Over the past 3 months, how have the following factors affected your bank's credit standards as applied to the approval of loans on credit lines to enterprises?"

  • When it comes to the cost related to the bank's capital position, the percentage of banks reporting tighter (higher) costs was 6%, while the percentage of banks reporting easing of capital cost conditions was zero.
  • There were zero banks reporting easing in capital costs conditions in April 2011 and January 2011.
  • 2010 average for the percentage of banks reporting tighter cost conditions in excess of those reporting easing of conditions at the end of July (6%) was identical to the 2010 annual average.
  • As shown in the chart below, bank's ability to access market funding remains on downward trend for second quarter in a row. At the end of July, the percentage of banks reporting tightening of access to market financing was 9%, same as for the three months through April 2011 and up on 4% in H2 2010.
  • At the same time, percentage of banks reporting easing of access to market funding dropped from 2% in 3 months to October 2010, to 1% through January 2011, to 0% in 6 months since January 2011.

And a summary plot of banks access to funding markets, showing new tightening trend:

When it comes to the banks' liquidity positions, the story is also that of continued and deepening deterioration:
  • 10% of banks in the survey stated that their liquidity conditions tightened in 3 months through July 2011, up from 8% in 3mo through April 2011 and 6% in 6 months before that.
  • Only 1% of banks stated that their liquidity positions have eased (improved) in 3 mos through April 2011, the same percentage as in 3 mos through April 2011 and down from 3% in 3 months through January 2011.
Meanwhile, banks competition is now running along a flat trend:
  • In 3 months through July 2011, 82% of the banks in the Euro area reported no change in competitive pressures from other banks, up from 79% in 3 months to April 2011, while 1% reported tightening and 8% reported easing of competition.
  • The same story, but less dramatic, holds for competition from non-banks and for competition from market (non-banks) financing.
  • The percentage of banks that observed tighter expectations of general economic activity in the end of July 2011 was 15%, as contrasted by just 4% that reported easing expectations.
So in summary, despite (or perhaps because of) the regulatory and recapitalization measures deployed, in 3 months to July 2011, Euro area banks continued to shrink supply of credit to Euro area enterprises because their funding conditions, liquidity positions, capital costs and expectations for economic activity were getting tighter. In the meantime, competition in European banking sector, having eased significantly from the peak crisis period, is running at generally depressed levels and along relatively flat trend.

Surely these are not the signs consistent with stable improvement or the end of the crisis?

Monday, August 22, 2011

22/08/2011: July Banks Survey - Euro area credit supply to enterprises

There are rumors circling euro area banks about the impeding liquidity crunch and rising risk profiles. In this light, it is illustrative to take a look at the latest Banks Lending Survey data from ECB to see if there are new trends emerging in terms of credit supply.

This post will look at some data from the Surveys covering lending to enterprises, while the follow up posts will deal with the core drivers of changes and with banks' lending to the households.

First, consider the aggregates (all data through July 2011) - with Chart below illustrating:
  • Overall in terms of lending to the euro area enterprises, 8% of banking survey respondents indicated that lending conditions have tightened or considerably tightened over 3 months through July 2011, while 5% indicated that their lending conditions eased or eased considerably.
  • The percentage of respondents who indicated tightening of conditions remained unchanged in July compared to June, but is up from 5% reported in May. Year on year, percentage of respondents reporting tighter lending conditions dropped by 4 percentage points, while percentage of those reporting easing of conditions rose 4 percentage points.
  • 87% of respondents indicated that their lending conditions were unchanged in 3 months through July 2011, down from 89%.
  • Over 3 months through July 2011, percentage of the banks reporting tighter lending conditions (8%) was below 9.25% 2010 average and significantly below 35% and 49.5% averages for 2009 and 2008.
  • The percentage of banks reporting easing of lending conditions in 3 months through July 2011 (5%) was above 2010 average of 3.75% and above 2008 and 2009 averages of 0.75% each.

For SMEs (Chart below illustrates):
  • Percentage of the banks reporting easing of considerable easing of lending conditions in 3 months through July 2011 was 3%, which is 3 percentage points above same period last year, but is unchanged from June and down from 4% in both April and May.
  • Percentage of the banks reporting tighter or considerably tighter lending conditions was 7% in 3 months through July 2011, up on 6% in May and June, but down from 15% in April. The percentage of banks reporting tighter lending to SMEs in 3 months through July 2011 was 7 percentage points lower than a years ago and at 7% compares favorably against 11.75% average for 2010 and 35.5% and 39% averages for 2009 and 2008 respectively.

For larger corporate loans (Chart below):
  • 9% of the banks reported tightening of lending conditions to large enterprises in 3 months through July 2011, which is 6 percentage points below the level of responses recorded in July 2010. However, the current percentage remains relatively close to 2010 average of 10.5%, although it is substantially down from 37.75% and 52.5% averages for 2009 and 2008.
  • Month-on-month, tighter conditions in July 2011 (9%) were less prevalent than in June (11%), but more prevalent than in May (7%).
  • Easing or considerable easing of lending to large enterprises was reported by 7% of the banks, up from 5% a month ago and 4 percentage points above the same level in July 2010.
  • Easing of conditions in 3 months through July 2011 (7%) is now ahead of the same figure for 2010 average (4.25%) and well ahead of both 2008 and 2009 averages of 0.5% and 0.75%.
On the net, data shows some stabilizing momentum in credit supply, but this momentum is extremely anemic. Overall, more lenders continue to tighten lending conditions for large enterprises and SMEs.

Tuesday, July 27, 2010

Friday, July 23, 2010

Economics 25/7/10: What lending markets tell us about EU policies

So the markets are not that enthused about the stress tests. After the initial bounce on the back of 'pass' grades, there are rising concerns about some 19 banks, including AIB, which were given 'all clear' with some serious stretch of assumptions.

But to see what is really going on behind the scenes, look no further than the actual interbank lending rates. In fact, the interbank lending markets provide a good reflection on the combined euroz one policies enacted since the beginning of the Greek debt crisis. Both euribor (the rate for uncollateralized lending across euro zone's prime banks) and eurepo (lending rates for collateralized loans between euro zone's prime banks) are significantly elevated on twin concerns about:
  1. The quality of the borrowing banks (recall - these are prime banks); and
  2. The quality of the collateral (with sovereign bonds being top tier quality, deterioration in sovereign debt ratings is hitting interbank markets hard).
Here are the usual, updated charts:

Chart 1Long maturities have been signalling extremely adverse effect of the Euro rescue package since its inception.

Medium-term maturities show severe deterioration since the euro rescue package. Steepest, and uninterrupted rise in 3 months euribor signals that the rescue package is faltering in delivering anything more than a buy-time for the euro… In other words, we have an expensive (€750 billion-sized) buy-in of short time.

The ECB claw back on longer term lending window did not help this process either. But the stress tests are doing nothing to stop the negative sentiment dynamics.

Chart 2Per chart 2 above, short-term maturities are showing that despite supplying underwriting to about a half of the full year worth of euro area bonds refinancing, the rescue package has achieved no moderation in the short-term risk perceptions of the market. In fact, the rise in euribor is more pronounced in the short term than in longer maturities, suggesting that short term risks of sovereign default remain unaddressed by the rescue package and are exerting a continuous pressure on interbank lending.

Introduction of the stress tests also did nothing to reduce overall cost of borrowing amongst the prime banks which were fully expected to pass the test even before the EU got on with setting test parameters.

In turn, all of this spells much higher costs of funding for the banks which have shorter term financing needs, such as the Irish banks. The implicit cost of taxpayers’ guarantee for Irish banks debt is therefore rising.

And panicked markets are not about to surrender their fears to the EU PR machine. With all the increases in the euribor, the volatility of the interbank lending rates also increased, across all maturities, as shown in charts 3 and 4 below.

Chart 3Chart 4As evident, in particular, from chart 4, in the longer term, credit markets are absolutely not buying the combination of the EU rescue package, ECB liquidity measures and the stress tests. Euribor trajectory for maturities of 6 months and higher firmly re-established and vastly exceeded volatility that preceded the pre-rescue panic. We are now worse off in terms of the cost of banks financing than we were before the Greek crisis blew up.


To remind you - Slide 5eurepo is the rate at which one prime bank lends funds in euro to another prime bank if in exchange the former receives from the latter the best collateral in terms of rating and liquidity within the Eurepo basket. Eurepo rates have posted dramatic increases since mid-June 2010. The original effect of the June 2010 closure of the longer maturity (12 months) ECB discount lending was a temporary reduction in the rates, followed by a stratospheric rise two week later that has been sustained through the end of this week. This is especially true for shorter term maturities, suggesting that part of the adverse effect was due to the heightened uncertainty around the EU stress tests. Chart 5 below illustrates.

Chart 5
Chart 6The u-shaped response in the interbank lending rates to ECB lending changes and to stress tests is even better reflected in the longer maturity eurepo rates, as highlighted in chart 6 above.

3-months and 12-months eurepo rates are now at the levels consistent with the height of the sovereign default crisis. There are significant differences in the rates by maturity group and vis-à-vis euribor due to the fact that the quality of collateral offered in the markets is now itself uncertain as sovereign credit quality continues to deteriorate both in terms of increasing probabilities of default and thus associated risk premia, but also due to the regulatory treatment of collateral that is being signalled by the stress tests.

As with euribor, eurepo rates are showing remarkable increases in volatility, for both shorter and longer term maturities.


Let us finally put the two rates side by side
to compare evolution of euribor against eurepo, setting index for all at 100=January 4, 2010

Chart 7
Chart 8
Some pretty dramatic stuff. To round off, recall that since the beginning of April 2010, the eurozone has undertaken the following measures to shore up its financial markets:
  1. Set up a sovereign rescue fund worth more than €750 billion to underpin roughly 50% of the total borrowing requirement in the euro zone (which could have been expected to yeild an improvement in banks collateral and thus a reduction in overall systemic risks in the interbank markets as well);
  2. Reduce maturity profile of ECB lending window (which was from the get-go equivalent to dumping more petrol on the forest fire);
  3. Deploy aggressive quantitative easing by the ECB (again, this should have reduced uncertainty in the interbank markets as in theory improved pricing for sovereign bonds should have increased the quality of interbank collateral and improve banks own books);
  4. Conduct an absolutely discredited stress test of the banks (designed to provide positive newsflow for the banks, especially for prime banks which should have seen their risk profiles reduced by a mere setting up of the test).
In short, none of the measures seem to be working, folks... May be, just may be, the real problem with EU banks is their unwillingness to come clean on loans losses and start honestly repairing their balancesheets?

Tuesday, July 20, 2010

Economics 20/7/10: EU test - have a Pass grade before you turn up for a check...

Per Bloomberg report today: “Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, the commercial-property and public-finance lender taken over by the German government, failed a Europe-wide banking stress test, two people familiar with the results said.” Crucially, however, “the Munich-based lender is probably the only German bank to fail the test, one person said.”

Makes you wonder – what kind of test is that if out of 91 not exactly rude-health institutions, only one is expected to fail? At an expected 99% success rate, the EU stress test is clearly designed to put a PR spin on banking sector shares, bonds and interbank credit markets.

The only sticky part is that if any of the ‘passed’ banks fail in the near future, the investors should be able to sue the EU for any losses incurred. You see, the EU stress test is designed – at least in theory – to provide important markets-relevant information to investors. If so, someone should be liable for the quality of the test. Had the EU authorities given this a thought?

The test is farcical. And you don’t need to see the results to know this much. European banks are set minimum requirement of 6% Tier 1 capital ratio. This is the number being tested. But the US banks had this requirement 2 years ago, and since then have beefed up their capital ratios to well in excess of 9%. UK banks are now in excess of 10%. Where does this put the Eurozone with its banking system ‘tested’ to 6%? In a circus terminology – with the clowns, large shoes, red noses and curly wigs in place. So the EU regulators’ decision to put some more powder over their mugs wont be doing much good.

FT blogs' Tracy Alloway reported today on what the markets think. The article (linked here) reports that there has been a 50% or more rise in the short positions held against a number of Eurozone banks. Ireland’s sick puppies – BofI and AIB are actually most active on long investors’ lists with long positions up ca 20%. But the two are also amongst the most expensive securities to borrow. In other words, it does seem like shorts are heavily on the side of Ireland Inc’s grand dames.

Funny thing, relating to the stress tests, is that a number of public officials – from Greece, to Belgium to Ireland – have already been leaking heavily the ‘news’ that stress tests will clear their banks’ names. One wonders if there is anything else the EU can do to make the whole exercise even more farcical?

Sunday, August 9, 2009

Economics 09/08/2009: Banks

A new post - the one promised a while ago - on Euro Area Banking Survey by ECB (July 2009 results), part 1 is now available on my Long Rune Economics blog here. Enjoy - most of this data has not seen the daylight in any media outlet and some of it has serious consequences for Irish banks, consumers etc... in other words - this is the bigger fish worth frying...