Showing posts with label equity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label equity. Show all posts

Thursday, August 20, 2020

20/8/20: All Markets are Now Monetized

 

While the economy burns, the stock markets are literally going bonkers. Here are the main implied volatility options:

Which are symmetric, in so far as they treat volatility as symmetrically-valued to the upside and downside. And here is another way of looking at the same concept via repricing speed, or the rate of change in actual P/E ratios of S&P500 over longer time horizons, in this case: 20 weeks running P/E ratios change:

Source of the chart is @longvieweconomics. What does the above show? We have S&P500 at an all-time high. S&P500's PE ratio (PER) is only slightly below the 2000 peak. And, we have the fastest rate of S&P over-valuation increase in history - full 85 percentage points trough to peak. Both, the fundamentals and the momentum of their deterioration are absolutely out of control. Of course, this is just the stocks. One must never mention the massive bubble blown up by the Fed in the bonds markets. 

The 20-weeks moving change in weekly yields for Aaa-rated bonds maxed out at historical high of -44.06% (remember, lower yields = higher prices) in the week of July 31st this year. Top three historically highest rates of change took place in the three weeks of July 24th-August 7 this year. Overall range of bonds repricing is in the range of 60 percentage points in the current cycle:

This is plain horrendous: there is nothing in the macro and micro fundamentals that can warrant these changes. Except for the expectation of continued monetary accommodation of the Wall Street into the infinitely long future. 


Sunday, January 5, 2020

5/1/20: EU's Latest Financial Transactions Tax Agreement


My article on the proposed EU-10 plan for the Financial Transaction Tax via The Currency:


Link: https://www.thecurrency.news/articles/5471/a-potential-risk-growth-hormone-what-the-financial-transaction-tax-would-mean-for-ireland-irish-banks-and-irish-investors or https://bit.ly/2QnVDjN.

Key takeaways:

"Following years of EU-wide in-fighting over various FTT proposals, ten European Union member states are finally approaching a binding agreement on the subject... Ireland, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus – the five countries known for aggressively competing for higher value-added services employers and tax optimising multinationals – are not interested."

"The rate will be set at 0.2 per cent and apply to the sales of shares in companies with market capitalisation in excess of €1 billion. This will cover also equity sales in European banks." Pension funds, trading in bonds and derivatives, and new rights issuance will be exempt.

One major fall out is that FTT "can result in higher volumes of sales at the times of markets corrections, sharper flash crashes and deeper markets sell-offs. In other words, lower short-term volatility from reduced speculation can be traded for higher longer-term volatility, and especially pronounced volatility during the crises. ... FTT is also likely to push more equities trading off-exchange, into the ‘dark pools’ and proprietary venues set up offshore, thereby further reducing pricing transparency and efficiency in the public markets."

Tuesday, July 2, 2019

2/7/19: Earnings and Market Valuations: Equity PEs


While P/E ratios are gamable and informationally highly restrictive, the metric is still a useful one when considering as to how expensive/cheap equity can be. Here is the latest chart via @topdowncharts showing P/E ratios based on 10 year average earnings (smoother series, but the long average is even less informationally rich than pure P/Es):


Which makes:

  1. U.S. markets overvalued in excess of 2006-2007 peaks, but less than in the blowout bubble of the dot.com era;
  2. Developed markets (ex-US) and Emerging markets relatively moderately priced.
Given the fact that U.S. equities earnings are probably the most susceptible to strategic manipulation, e,.g. shares buybacks, M&As and earnings/cash management, the U.S. markets are in heading for trouble.

Wednesday, June 12, 2019

12/6/19: Credit Markets vs Banks Loans: Europe vs US


Related to the earlier post on investment markets composition by intermediary (see: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2019/06/12619-investment-intermediaries-europe.html), here is more evidence, via @jerrycap of the massive share of intermediated debt / banks dependency in European markets:

A caveat worth noting: European data includes the UK, where equity markets and hybrid financing are both more advanced than in the Continental Europe, which suggests that the share on non-bank share of debt markets is even smaller than the 25% currently estimated.

12/6/19: Investment Intermediaries: Europe vs U.S.


Investment markets intermediaries by type and origin (via @schuldensuehner):


Caveat: In the case of Ireland and Switzerland, the data is not representative of the domestic markets.

Loads of interesting insights, but one macro-level important is the role of the non-banking investment players, especially domestic ones, in the economies of the U.S. and Germany, Italy, Spain and France. This highlights the huge role of direct investment channels (equity, debt, hybrids) in the U.S. market and the corresponding weight of intermediated bank debt in Europe. We highlight this anomaly and the failures of the EU to diversify capital funding channels

  • In our paper here: Gurdgiev, Constantin and Lyon, Tracy Lee and Cohen, Alexandra and Poda, Margaret and Salyer, Matthew, Capital Markets Union: An Action Plan of Unfinished Reforms (March 21, 2019). with Tracy Lee Lyon, Alexandra Cohen, Margaret Poda and Matthew Salyer (Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS); GUE/NGL Group, European Parliament, Policy Analysis Paper, March 2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3357380 and 
  • In a recent article for the LSE Business Review here: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2019/05/27519-lse-business-review-capital.html



Saturday, November 17, 2018

17/11/18: Nine in Ten in the Red: Asset Markets YTD Returns Signal Risk Repricing


According to a recent research note from the Deutsche Bank, 89% of global macro assets are posting losses on year-to-date basis. This is the highest level of losses in more than a century.


Given the scale of financial risk mis-pricing in equities and bonds markets in the post-QE period, we are likely to witness more downward movement in the assets valuations in months to come. A gradual deleveraging that the market trends have been supporting so far remains highly incomplete and requires more pronounced re-pricing of assets to the downside.

Read more on this here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/11/161118-horsemen-of-financial-markets.html

Sunday, October 13, 2013

13/10/2013: On Taxes, Debt & Equity

EU Commission published some interesting research into Tax Reforms across the EU. The paper is available here: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee5_en.pdf

One interesting topic covered relates to the substitution away from equity in favour of debt funding in corporate capital investment. A chart to start with:


Now, per above, the disincentives to equity investment and incentives in favour of debt seem to be the lowest (in euro area) in Cyprus and Ireland. Note that these countries are associated with aggressive brass-plating (Luxembourg) are distinct from countries with aggressive tax arbitrage activities (Cyprus and Ireland). And thus, behold the skew in the EU Commission analysis: MNCs investing into these countries do not use debt on-shoring (US MNCs do not borrow in these countries), but use registry of equity there (for example, in Irish case - due to FDI-booked investments, or equity investment by IFSC companies, ditto for old Cypriot banking system vis Russian corporates).

The EU admits almost as much:
"There is also evidence that the tax advantage of debt fuels international profit-shifting activities as
rules on interest deductibility differ between countries and there are mismatches in decisions on which instruments are considered debt financing. Several studies analyse the debt financing of multinationals with either parent companies or subsidiaries in the United States, Germany, Canada and the EU. The results of these studies suggest that firms use intra-group loans to adapt their financial structure and minimise their overall tax burden. By shifting debt to an affiliate located in a high-tax country, corporate groups are able to deduct interest payments against a higher statutory tax rate while the interest received by the lending affiliate is taxed at a lower rate. Taking data from 32 European countries between 1994 and 2003, Huizinga et al. (2008) find that a 10 % increase in the tax rate increases leverage by 1.8 %. The authors also show evidence of debt-shifting as, for multinationals with two equal-size establishments in two countries, a 10 % increase in the tax rate in one country leads to an increase in leverage of the company located in that country by 2.4 % and a decrease in leverage in the affiliated foreign company by 0.6 %."

However, overall the tax rates also play the role in this debt-shifting: "Two recent meta-studies by Feld et al. (2013) and de Mooij (2011a) review the existing empirical studies and find that ... a one percentage point higher CIT rate is associated with a 0.27 percentage point higher debt-asset ratio."

Two more major points raised in the paper:


  1. Welfare costs: "The tax bias towards debt financing also creates welfare costs. Weichenrieder and Klautke (2008) estimate this cost at between 0.08 % and 0.23 % of GDP, while Gordon (2010) estimates it at about 0.25 % of GDP. As pointed by de Mooij (2011b), these estimates ...fails to take into account the heterogeneity of responses and hence the additional welfare costs due to misallocations. Existing studies also fail to include the larger welfare costs of the negative externalities of using debt, such as systemic risk, the probability of default and the social costs of business cycle fluctuations. Finally, they do not take into account the distortions created by debtshifting activities and misallocation due to international tax arbitrage and administrative and compliance costs (de Mooij, 2011b). Consequently, the welfare impact of the debt bias can be assumed to be higher than what has been found in the literature so far."
  2. Banking Systems and Debt Shifting: "Keen and de Mooij (2012) ...show that taxes influence the capital structure of banks and that, despite capital requirement constraints, the size of the effects of corporate taxation on the financial structure of banks is close to those for non-financial firms." In other words: capital rules do not induce any significant changes in banks behaviour when it comes to funding of banking activities: debt incentives still drive leverage up. Furthermore, "Hemmelgarn and Teichmann (2013) have found that bank leverage, dividend payouts and earnings management (in terms of loan loss reserves) react to changes in the domestic statutory CIT (corporate income tax) rate. ...In the three years after a tax increase by 10 percentage points, the results predict an increase in leverage of 0.98 percentage points or a relative increase by about 1.1 % (in relation to the equity ratio it would mean a notable relative decrease, of 8.9 % of equity)." Core conclusion: "These results suggest that a reduction in the preferential treatment of debt would result in a significant decrease in bank leverage. In addition, the results also show that regulatory capital requirements in the banking sector alone do not seem to be a prime determinant of financial structure. ... the effect of taxation conflicts with the aim of current regulatory reform to increase capital in the context of Basel III."

Monday, April 22, 2013

22/4/2013: Who funds growth in Europe?..

There are charts and then there are Charts. One example of the latter is via IMF CR1371

The above shows a number of really interesting differences between the euro area and the US, as well as within euro area:

  • Look at the share of overall funding accruing to the traditional (deposits) banks in the US (tiny) and the euro area (massive) - debt is the preferred form of funding for Europe
  • Look at the share of equity in the US funding and in euro area, ex-Luxembourg - equity is not a preferred way for funding growth in Europe.
  • Why the above matter? Simply put, debt - especially banks debt - is not challenging existent ownership of the firm raising funding. Which means that patriarchal structures of family-owned firms, with their inefficient and paternalistic hiring and promotions and management systems can be sustained more easily in the case of debt-funded firms than in the case of equity funded ones.
  • Look at the role played in the US by the credit supplied by 'other financial institutions' - non-banks. Again, these would be more 'activist'-styled funding streams exerting more pressure on management and ownership structures.
What about Ireland? Look at the composition of funding sources in the country:
  1. Strong reliance on corporate bonds markets is probably reflective of three factors: (a) concentrated loans issued during the building boom and related to construction, development & investment in land remain the legacy of the boom and rely on collateralized bonds issuance, (b) banks funding via collateralization, (c) concentrated nature of Irish listed plcs, (d) massive M&A spree undertaken by Irish plcs and larger private companies on foot of cheap leverage available in the 2000-2007 period, etc. The volume of bonds might be large, but their quality is most likely lower due to the above points.
  2. Strong - actually second strongest in the sample after Cyprus - reliance on bank lending to fund economy.
  3. Weak, extremely thin equity cushion. 
Now, keep in mind: equity is the best, most stable and most suitable for absorbing crisis impact form of funding.

Tuesday, August 28, 2012

28/8/2012: Debt- v Equity-led Funding and Systemic Crises


Apparently, there's been some serious movements in today's banks CDS, signaling some pressure building up in the system and potentially a disconnect between equity markets and bond markets. This wouldn't be the first time the two are mis-firing in an almost random fashion. In the longer-term, however, such episodes are very troubling for a good reason - long term imbalances build up in the two sources of capital funding is hard to unwind. It turns out, however, the difficulty of unwinding these is non-symmetric.

Last week's NBER Working Paper number 18329 (link here), titled "Debt- and Equity-led Capital Flow Episodes" by Kristin J. Forbes and Francis E. Warnock looked at "the episodes of extreme capital flow movements—surges, stops, flight, and retrenchment... [leading to] the question of":

  • Which types of capital flows are driving the episodes and 
  • If debt- ( bonds and banking flows) and equity-led (portfolio equity and FDI) episodes differ in material ways. 
"After identifying debt- and equity-led episodes, we find that most episodes of extreme capital flow movements around the world are debt-led and the factors associated with debt-led episodes are similar to the factors behind episodes identified with aggregate capital flow data. In contrast, equity-led episodes are less frequent, more idiosyncratic, and differ in nature from other episodes."

The study uses data on 50 emerging and developed countries starting with 1980 (at the earliest) and running through 2009.

The study found that "the vast majority of extreme capital flow episodes across our sample—80% 

of inflow episodes (surges and stops) and 70% of outflow episodes (flight and retrenchments)—are 
fueled by debt, not equity, flows."

After that, the paper develops analysis of "the factors that are associated with debt- and equity-led episodes of extreme capital flows. We follow the Forbes and Warnock (2012) analysis here by describing capital flow episodes as being driven by specific global factors, contagion, 

and/or domestic factors." 

The study found that: "to a first approximation equity-led episodes appear to be idiosyncratic, bearing 
little systematic relation to our explanatory variables. Notably, even the risk measures that were 
highlighted in Forbes and Warnock (2012) as being significantly related to extreme movements in 
aggregate capital flows have little or no significant relationship with equity-led episodes. In contrast, 
risk measures are important in explaining debt-led episodes; when risk aversion is high, debt-led surges 
are less likely and debt-led stops are more likely. Contagion, especially regional, is also important for 
debt-led episodes. Country-level variables are largely insignificant, except for domestic growth shocks; 
debt-led stops are more likely in countries experiencing a negative growth shock and debt-led surges are more likely in countries with a positive growth shock."

Perhaps in a warning to the policymakers currently embarking on financial repression path for dealing with the ongoing crises, "capital controls have little or no significance in  both equity-led and debt-led episodes, as also found in Forbes and Warnock (2012)."

Of course, we have to keep in mind that the current crisis is really a debt-led capital markets crisis, both at the corporate and sovereigns levels. And it is symmetric both for the US and Europe, where the main difference is not as much in equity vs debt financing, but in intermediated vs direct debt issuance.